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Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution
James Steven Rogers∗
Squishy. That’s been the rap on the law of restitution since before
there even was a law of restitution. In Moses v. Macferlan,1 Lord
Mansfield stated that whenever the defendant is "under an obligation, from
the ties of natural justice, to refund" the money, the law allows an "action
[for money had and received], founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s
case."2 Lord Mansfield commented that "[t]his kind of equitable action, to
recover back money, which ought not in justice to be kept, is very
beneficial, and therefore much encouraged."3 As he summarized the point,
"In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity
to refund the money."4 That was undoubtedly one of the decisions that the
anonymous writer Junius had in mind in his 1770 accusation against
Mansfield that "instead of those positive rules, by which the judgment of a
court of law should invariably be determined, you have fondly introduced
your own unsettled notions of equity and substantial justice."5 Although the
law of restitution is now respectable in England, during the early twentieth
century English judges seem to have delighted in heaping scorn upon the
notion that cases could be determined by "that vague jurisprudence which is
sometimes attractively styled ‘justice as between man and man.’"6 As
Thomas Edward Scrutton remarked, "The whole history of this particular
form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning
sloppiness of thought."7 Even someone as friendly to the law of restitution
as John Dawson famously remarked that the unjust enrichment principle
"has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off
the dock."8
∗
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Professor, Boston College Law School.
Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 681.
Id.
LETTERS OF JUNIUS, Letter XVI (John Cannon ed., 1978).
Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 140.
Holt v. Markham [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513.
JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8 (1951).

1377

1378

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1377 (2011)

At the outset of the project that has now resulted in the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment,9 Reporter Andrew Kull
confronted this problem head on. At the ALI’s initial consideration of the
project in 2000, he noted the perceived "amorphous" nature of the subject,
remarking that many people have felt that "a purported legal principle that
necessarily appeals to a shared sense of what equity and good conscience
require is untrustworthy."10 Has the effort to make restitution more
determinate succeeded, or is the law of restitution still saddled with a
degree of reliance on vague concepts of justice that marks it as distinctly
different from its cousins, the laws of tort and contract?11
One reading the new Restatement is likely to conclude that appeals to
vague concepts of justice are characteristic of the law of restitution.
Consider the solutions the Restatement offers to the following problems. A
person who mistakenly discharged a lien on property seeks subrogation to
the discharged lien. Is the remedy available? That depends on whether
such relief is "necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the other."12 A
person who mistakenly conferred a non-monetary benefit on another seeks
to recover the value of the benefit. Is the remedy available? That depends
on whether such relief is "necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."13 A
person who mistakenly improved another’s property seeks to recover the
value of the improvement. Is the remedy available? That depends on
whether such relief is "necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."14 A person
who mistakenly made a gift seeks to recover the value of the gift. Is the
remedy available? That depends on whether such relief is "necessary to
prevent the unintended enrichment of the recipient."15 A person who
mistakenly executed a writing that did not express the parties’ actual
agreement seeks reformation. Is the remedy available? That depends on
whether such relief is "necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the

9. The recently completed project is referred to herein as the "Restatement" and is
cited herein as "R3RUE."
10. 77 A.L.I. PROC. 239 (May 17, 2000).
11. Of course, one might say that the open appeal to concepts of justice is a virtue, not
a defect, of the law of restitution. My point is not to agree or disagree with such
assessments, but to ask whether the law of restitution is really different in this respect from
other bodies of law.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 8(2) (2011)
[hereinafter R3RUE] (Payment in Discharge of Lien).
13. Id. § 9(1) (Benefits Other than Money).
14. Id. § 10 (Mistaken Improvements).
15. Id. § 11 (Mistake in Gifts Inter Vivos).
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other."16 In these, as well as numerous other sections of the Restatement,
the operative legal rule is expressed with a qualification that relief is
available only "as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."17
Other provisions of the Restatement use somewhat different, but
equally vague, formulations. Suppose that a person lacking capacity, such
as a minor, transferred property and now seeks to recover it. Is the remedy
available? That depends on whether the transferee gave value and acted
reasonably, in which case "the court may qualify or deny the right to
rescission . . . to avoid an inequitable result."18 Suppose that a person who
provided professional services to protect another’s life or health seeks to
recover the value of the services. Is the remedy available? That depends
on whether "the circumstances justify the decision to intervene without
request."19 Is one who benefitted by interfering with another’s legally
protected interests required to disgorge that benefit? That depends on
whether "competing legal objectives make such liability inappropriate."20
In general, can a person who transferred money or property avoid the
transaction and recover what was transferred? That depends on whether the
plaintiff "compensates the other for loss from related expenditure as justice
may require," whether "the interests of justice are served by allowing the
claimant to reverse the challenged transaction," whether "rescission would
prejudice intervening rights of innocent third parties," and whether the
plaintiff is guilty of "prejudicial or speculative delay . . . in asserting a right
of rescission, or a change of circumstances unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant, justifies denial of the remedy."21 May a constructive trust be
imposed on property? That depends on whether the recipient "is unjustly
enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property."22 May an
16. Id. § 12 (Mistake in Expression).
17. For additional examples of this language, see R3RUE §§ 18 (Judgment
Subsequently Reversed or Avoided); 19 (Recovery of Tax Payments); 23 (Performance of a
Joint Obligation (Indemnity and Contribution)); 24 (Performance of an Independent
Obligation (Equitable Subrogation)); 25 (Uncompensated Performance Under Contract with
Third Person); 26 (Protection of Claimant’s Property); 27 (Claimant’s Expectation of
Ownership); 28 (Unmarried Cohabitants); 29 (Common Fund); 30 (Unrequested
Intervention: Residual Rule); 32 (Illegality); 33 (Incapacity of Recipient); 36 (Restitution to
a Party in Default).
18. Id. § 16(3)(b) (Incapacity of Transferor).
19. Id. § 20(1) (Protection of Another’s Life or Health). Essentially the same
formulation appears in Sections 21 (Protection of Another’s Property) and 22 (Performance
of Another’s Duty).
20. Id. § 44(1) (Interference with Other Protected Interests).
21. Id. § 54 (Rescission and Restitution).
22. Id. § 55 (Constructive Trust).
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equitable lien be imposed on property of a person who "is unjustly enriched
by a transaction?" That depends on whether "the connection between
unjust enrichment and the defendant’s ownership of particular property
makes it equitable that the claimant have recourse to that property."23 May
a person whose property is used to discharge a lien obtain relief by
subrogation? That depends on whether "the defendant is unjustly
enriched," but "the remedy of subrogation may be qualified or withheld
when necessary to avoid an inequitable result in the circumstances of a
particular case."24 May a person assert a tracing claim to more valuable
property obtained by a wrongdoer with the claimant’s property? That
depends on whether the relief sought "is grossly disproportionate to any
loss on which the claimant’s right to restitution is based."25 Will a
restitution claim succeed against a person who has changed position? That
depends on whether "an obligation to make restitution of the original
benefit would be inequitable to the recipient."26 Will delay preclude the
claim of a person otherwise entitled to an equitable remedy? That depends
on whether "the remedy in question would be unfairly prejudicial to another
party because of an intervening change of circumstances."27
So, the accusation of reliance on vague concepts of justice certainly
seems to be borne out by an examination of the Restatement. Yet, it is a
different question whether the law of restitution is in this respect
significantly different from other bodies of law. Let us begin by
considering the law of torts.28 Is a person who touches another liable for
battery? That depends on whether the contact is "offensive,"29 meaning "it
offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity."30 Is a person liable for
causing emotional distress to another? That depends on whether the
defendant’s conduct was "extreme and outrageous."31 Is a person
privileged to use force to protect himself against another? That depends on
23. Id. § 56(1)(b) (Equitable Lien).
24. Id. § 57 (Subrogation as a Remedy).
25. Id. § 58(3)(c) (Following Property Into its Product and Against Transferees).
26. Id. § 65 (Change of Position).
27. Id. § 70(2)(b) (Limitation of Actions; Laches).
28. For convenience, citations herein are to the Second Restatement of Torts, rather
than to the corresponding provisions of those portions of the Third Restatement that have
been completed at this time. Needless to say, the law of tort has not become more
determinate in the years since publication of the Second Restatement.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) (Battery: Offensive Contact).
30. Id. § 19 (What Constitutes Offensive Contact).
31. Id. § 46 (Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress).
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whether he used only "reasonable" force to "defend himself against
unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he
reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally on him."32
Is a person liable to another for conversion of another chattel? That
depends on whether the defendant’s action "so seriously interferes with [the
plaintiff’s rights] that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the
full value of the chattel."33 Is a person liable for negligent harm to another?
That depends on whether the defendant acted as would "a reasonable man
under like circumstances."34 Is a seller of a product liable for harm the
product causes to a user? That depends on whether the product was in "a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property."35 Is a defendant’s conduct the proximate cause of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff? That depends on such matters as whether the
defendant’s conduct was "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,"36
whether "looking back from the harm to the actor’s negligent conduct, it
appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about
the harm,"37 and whether the harm was produced by some superseding
factors that "appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in
view of the circumstances."38 Is the owner of livestock liable for a trespass
by the animals? That depends on whether the harm "might reasonably be
expected to result from the intrusion of livestock," or whether the harm
resulted from "the unexpectable operation of a force of nature."39 Is a
person liable for harm resulting from an "abnormally dangerous activity"?
That depends on such factors as whether the activity presented "a high risk
of some harm," whether the activity "is not a matter of common usage," the
"inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on," and
the "extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes."40 Is a person liable for fraudulently misrepresenting
a fact? That depends on whether the other party acted in "justifiable
32. Id. § 63 (Self-Defense by Force Not Threatening Death or Serious Bodily Harm).
33. Id. § 222A (What Constitutes Conversion).
34. Id. § 283 (Conduct of a Reasonable Man: the Standard).
35. Id. § 402A (Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer).
36. Id. § 431 (What Constitutes Legal Cause).
37. Id. § 435(2) (Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence).
38. Id. § 442(b) (Considerations Important in Determining Whether an Intervening
Force Is a Superseding Cause).
39. Id. § 504 (Liability for Trespass by Livestock).
40. Id. § 520 (Abnormally Dangerous Activities).
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reliance on the misrepresentation."41 Is a person liable for defamation if he
publishes information in circumstances that would ordinarily be privileged?
That depends on whether "he abuses the privilege."42 Is a person liable for
intruding upon another’s seclusion or privacy? That depends on whether
"the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."43 Is a
person liable for interfering with another person’s performance of a
contract? That depends on whether he acted "improperly," which depends
on a variety of factors, including "the nature of the actor’s conduct," "the
interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes," and "the
social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other."44 Is a person liable in nuisance for
interfering with another’s right to use and enjoy his land? That depends on
whether the other suffered "significant harm, of a kind that would be
suffered by a normal person in the community,"45 and on whether the
actor’s conduct was "unreasonable."46 Can a person recover damages for
the consequences of another’s tortious act? That depends on whether the
harm suffered was one that "he could have avoided by the use of reasonable
effort or expenditure after commission of the tort."47
Now let us consider the law of contract. At first blush, it might appear
that vague ethical concepts play a lesser role here than in either restitution
or tort. In the basic rules of contract law, we do not find phrases such as "a
person has a claim for breach of contract if the promisor unjustifiably failed
to perform." If one has made a contract one must perform. There is no
need to refer to vague notions of justice to reach that result. In part, that
merely reflects the different role of the law of contract as distinguished
from the law of tort or restitution. Basic contract law is a body of rules for
transactions where nothing has gone wrong. Contract law states that parties
who have entered into contracts have a legal obligation to perform their
promises. But parties who have entered into contracts have far simpler
reasons for performing. In the routine case where nothing has gone wrong,
the parties have the ordinary human and economic incentives to perform.
Legal rules may reinforce those duties, but they are unlikely to be the sole
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 525 (Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentation).
Id. § 599 (Abuse of Privilege: General Principle).
Id. § 652B (Intrusion Upon Seclusion).
Id. § 767 (Factors Determining Whether Interference is Improper).
Id. § 821F (Types of Nuisance: Significant Harm).
Id. § 822 (Private Nuisance: Elements of Liability).
Id. § 918 (Avoidable Consequences).
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or primary reason that people perform contracts. Tort and restitution, by
contrast, are bodies of law for situations where something has gone wrong.
Tort law does not set out the rules of the road for the kind of careful driving
that we all do every day. Rather, tort law deals with cases where cars
crashed. Restitution law does not set out the ordinary rules for exchange—
it deals with cases where something has gone terribly wrong. Thus, it is
hardly surprising that the basic rules of contract seem to be simple, for they
are the rules for cases where nothing has gone wrong.
Yet if we turn from basic rules of contract formation to rules dealing
with defenses to contract enforcement, the role of fuzzy concepts becomes
much more apparent. Should a party be relieved from a contract that was
formed on the basis of a mutual mistake? That depends on such factors as
whether the risk of mistake "is allocated to him on the ground that it is
reasonable in the circumstances to do so,"48 and whether the person’s
failure to discover the mistake "amounts to a failure to act in good faith and
in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing."49 Should a court
decline to enforce a contract if only one party was mistaken? That depends
on whether "the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable."50 If the court does decide not to
enforce a contract formed on the basis of a mistake, is a remedy required
for performance that has taken place? In such a case, "the court may grant
relief on such terms as justice requires."51 Should a court decline to enforce
a contract entered into on the basis of one party’s misrepresentation? That
may depend on whether the other party "is justified in relying" on the
misrepresentation.52
Should a court decline to enforce a term of a contract on the basis that
it violates "public policy"? That depends on whether "the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against enforcement."53 Should a court decline to enforce a term of a
contract that might adversely affect competition? That depends on whether
the term "is unreasonably in restraint of trade."54 Should a court decline to
enforce a term of a contract that might adversely affect family relations?
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(c) (1977) (When a Party Bears the
Risk of a Mistake).
49. Id. § 157 (Effect of Fault of Party Seeking Relief).
50. Id. § 153(a) (When Mistake of One Party Makes a Contract Voidable).
51. Id. § 158(2) (Relief Including Restitution).
52. Id. § 164 (When a Misrepresentation Makes a Contract Voidable).
53. Id. § 178 (When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy).
54. Id. § 186 (Promise in Restraint of Trade).
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That may depend on whether the term "is unreasonably in restraint of
marriage,"55 whether the term "would change some essential incident of the
marriage relationship in a way detrimental to the public interest in the
marriage relationship,"56 or whether the term, if it affects child custody, "is
consistent with the best interests of the child."57
Suppose that an agreement fails to specify an essential term. "[A] term
which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."58
Suppose that an agreement provides that one party will perform to the
satisfaction of the other. Can we decide whether such performance has
been rendered? That depends on whether "it is practicable to determine
whether a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would be
satisfied."59 Should a court strictly enforce an agreement providing that one
party’s duty to perform is discharged by the non-occurrence of a condition?
That depends on whether doing so "would cause a disproportionate
forfeiture."60 Does one party’s failure to perform discharge the other
party’s duty to perform? That depends on whether the failure to perform
was "material,"61 which depends in turn on such factors as whether the
injured party "will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably
expected,"62 and whether the conduct of the non-performing party
"comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing."63 Suppose that
something causes one party to believe that the other party will not perform.
If the complaining party has "reasonable grounds to believe" that the other
will not perform, he can demand "adequate assurance of due performance"
and may, "if reasonable, suspend" performance until he receives such
assurance.64 Can a contractual right be assigned? That depends on whether
assignment would "materially" change the obligor’s duty.65 Can a promisee
refuse to accept performance from someone to whom the original promisor
55. Id. § 189 (Promise in Restraint of Marriage).
56. Id. § 190(1) (Promise Detrimental to Marital Relationship).
57. Id. § 191 (Promise Affecting Custody).
58. Id. § 204 (Supplying an Omitted Essential Term).
59. Id. § 228 (Satisfaction of the Obligor as a Condition).
60. Id. § 229 (Excuse of a Condition to Avoid Forfeiture).
61. Id. § 237 (Effect on Other Party’s Duties of a Failure to Render Performance).
62. Id. § 241(a) (Circumstances Significant in Determining Whether a Failure is
Material).
63. Id. § 241(e) (Circumstances Significant in Determining Whether a Failure is
Material).
64. Id. § 251 (When a Failure to Give Assurance May Be Treated as a Repudiation).
65. Id. § 317(2)(a) (Assignment of a Right).
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delegated the duty to perform? That depends on whether the promisee "has
a substantial interest" in having the original party perform.66
Can a person recover damages that he might have prevented by taking
some other action? That depends on whether "the injured party could have
avoided [the loss] without undue risk, burden, or humiliation,"67 and on
whether he made "reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid the loss."68
Can a party recover for consequential damages suffered as a result of the
other party’s failure to perform? That depends on whether the damages
were of a sort that the breaching party had "reason to foresee as a probable
result of the breach."69 Even if so, the damages will not be recoverable if
the court "concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to
avoid disproportionate compensation."70 Is a party entitled to an order of
specific performance? Perhaps, "in the discretion of the court,"71 "on such
terms as justice requires."72
So far, we have considered only concepts of traditional contract law.
The role of fuzzy concepts becomes even more apparent if we turn to
situations where a promise is not enforceable under traditional doctrine, but
the other party has changed position as a result of the making of the
promise. The most obvious example is promissory estoppel. Is a person
who acts on the basis of a promise not supported by consideration entitled
to recover from the promisor? That depends on whether "injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."73 If a person who received
something in the past now promises to pay for it, is the promisor liable for
failing to perform? Perhaps, if the remedy "is necessary to prevent
injustice."74 Suppose that an offeree who reasonably took action on the
assumption that an offer would not be revoked learns that the offeror
revoked before the offeree has had a chance to accept. Is the offeree
entitled to any recovery? Perhaps, "to the extent necessary to avoid
injustice."75 If a person who received an oral promise to convey land
significantly changed position in reliance on the oral promise, is the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. § 318(2) (Delegation of Performance of Duty).
Id. § 350(1) (Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages).
Id. § 350(2) (Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages).
Id. § 351(1) (Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages).
Id. § 351(3) (Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages).
Id. § 357(1) (Availability of Specific Performance and Injunction).
Id. § 358(1) (Form of Order and Other Relief).
Id. § 90 (Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance).
Id. § 86 (Promise for Benefit Received).
Id. § 87(2) (Option Contract).
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promisee entitled to specific performance? Perhaps, if "injustice can be
avoided only by specific enforcement."76 If a person reasonably relied on
some other oral promise covered by the statute of frauds, is some remedy
required? Perhaps, "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."77
As a final illustration of the role of fuzzy concepts of justice in the law
of contract, consider the elephant in the room: "Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement."78 Actually, there are two elephants. "If a contract or term
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."79 So, the
content of contract law really seems to be that we will require promises to
be performed, unless we decide not to do so in a particular case.
Now let us turn from this quick survey of the law of restitution, tort,
and contract and consider in greater detail why lawyers seem to feel that the
law of restitution is particularly indefinite. Part of the answer may be a lack
of clarity about the word "equity." The classic example of this confusion is
Kossian v. American National Insurance Co.80 Kossian had performed
cleanup work on a burned building under an agreement with the owner of
the building. The owner went bankrupt before paying for the work, and a
company that held a mortgage on the property took possession. The
property was insured, and the mortgagee was the loss payee. Under the
terms of the policy, the mortgagee was entitled to collect an amount that
included the costs of the cleanup. The court could not stomach the fact that
the mortgagee collected from the insurer for the cost of the work, even
though Kossian had not been paid for the work. Kossian was allowed to
recover, in an opinion principally notable for the obscurity of its rationale.
Indeed, the court seems to have taken a perverse delight in its inability to
classify the case:
Lack of precedent applicable to the facts peculiar to this case is not
surprising, however, as the authors of the Restatement [(First) of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 129 (Action in Reliance; Specific Performance).
Id. § 139 (Enforcement by Virtue of Action in Reliance).
Id. § 205 (Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing).
Id. § 208 (Unconscionable Contract or Term).
Kossian v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
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Restitution] recognize that the essential nature of equity cases concerned
with problems of restitution makes definitive precedent unlikely.81

Careful commentators have pointed out again and again the confusion that
underlies such uses of the word "equity" and its cognates.82 In legal
discourse, the word "equitable" is sometimes used as a simple English
language term meaning "fair." In other legal contexts, however, it is used
to refer to the complex historical phenomenon that English and American
law developed in two separate court systems: the regular courts of law and
the "Courts of Equity." All one need do to avoid the confusion is to
substitute the word "fair" for "equitable," and the words "Court of
Chancery" for "Court of Equity."
Courts dealing with restitution cases are, of course, obliged to reach
fair results. That, however, has nothing to do with the historical oddity that
we once had separate courts of law and of chancery. All courts need to
decide what resolution of the case before them is "fair." That is true
whether the subject matter would be classified as restitution, tort, contract,
or anything else. Suppose that the judges and lawyers who are so fond of
vague references to "equity" in restitution cases were dealing instead with
ordinary tort or contract cases. Would they say "This is an action at law,
not in equity, so there is no need for us to reach a fair result"?
In other fields, no one seems to have difficulty with the word
"equitable." Consider the tort of nuisance. A person whose land is injured
by noxious emissions from an adjoining parcel might bring an action
seeking damages for the harm to her property. Alternatively, the person
might seek an injunction compelling the defendant to cease the pollution.
No one would have any difficulty seeing that the action for damages is an
action "at law," that is, it is an action that, centuries ago, would have been
brought in the regular King’s Courts. If, centuries ago, the plaintiff had
sought an injunction, she would have proceeded in the Court of Chancery.
If someone asked whether the law of nuisance is an "equitable" subject, any
well-trained lawyer would say that the question makes no sense. If the
remedy sought is damages, the case would—years ago—have been brought
in the court of law. If the remedy sought is an injunction, the case would
have been brought in the court of chancery. The same is true of the law of
contracts. Suppose that the seller refuses to perform a contract for the sale
81. Id.
82. E.g., Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of
Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L.
ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES AND MATERIALS 469–530 (8th ed. 2011).
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of land. The buyer can bring an action "at law" for money damages.
Alternatively, the buyer can bring an action "in equity" for specific
performance. No one would say that contracts is an equity subject. For no
apparent reason, however, courts and lawyers dealing with restitution
actions seem to revel in referring to "equity" and describing restitution
actions as "equitable." Section 4 of the Restatement—aptly titled
"Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both"—makes a valiant effort to
dispel this confusion. Only time will tell whether that effort will be
successful.
The notion that the law of restitution is somehow deficient in that it
relies so heavily on vague principles of justice seems particularly odd when
one examines the ethical principles that underlie the law of restitution, tort,
and contract. It is common to describe the law of restitution as based on the
unjust enrichment principle, that is, a person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another owes a duty to pay a sum of money that
will disgorge the unjust enrichment. Though it is less common to do so,
one could describe the law of tort or contract in analogous terms. Thus, the
basic principle of the law of tort could be described as the "unjust injury
principle," that is, a person who unjustifiably harms another owes a duty to
pay a sum of money that will compensate the other for the harm. Similarly,
the basic principle of the law of contract could be described as the "unjust
breach of promise principle," that is, a person who unjustifiably fails to
perform a promise to another owes a duty to pay a sum of money that will
place the non-breaching party where she would have been if the promise
had been performed.
Now consider the intuitive appeal of these three basic ethical
principles. The foundation of tort is the notion that one must not
unjustifiably harm another, and that a person who unjustifiably harms
another must pay compensation. That is by no means an obvious principle.
Holmes advocated the principle that, as a starting place, losses should rest
where they fall, so that a cause of action in tort should be recognized only if
the defendant can plausibly be regarded as at fault in causing the loss.83
Much of the development of tort law in the twentieth century can be
regarded as a reaction against that notion. Perhaps, in at least some
circumstances, a person should be liable in tort even though he was not at
fault. For example, if I keep a dangerous animal, perhaps I should be liable
for any losses caused by that animal, even though I was scrupulously
careful in my efforts to control it. Of more concern in present day affairs, if
83.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 77–129 (1881).
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I manufacture a product that causes a loss, perhaps I should be liable for
any harm caused by its use, even though I was scrupulously careful in my
efforts to manufacture the product safely.
By the end of the twentieth century, liability without fault in tort had
reached an extent that would presumably have shocked Holmes. Nor would
he be alone. Tort liability has produced a major backlash in the public eye.
Talk of a "litigation-happy" nation has become commonplace, with the
usual set piece being the suit against McDonald’s brought by a person who
spilled hot coffee on herself.84 Note the basic problem: Tort is concerned
solely with the allocation of losses. There are no winners, only losers. If
we decide that the circumstances do give rise to liability in tort, then we
shift a loss from the plaintiff to the defendant. Instead of one loser, we
have another. Not surprisingly, tort theorists have wrestled for centuries—
and will continue to do so for many more centuries—with the question of
the justification for such loss shifting.
The basic principle of contract law could be stated as "a person must
not unjustifiably fail to perform a promise made to another person." A
person who does unjustifiably fail to perform must pay an amount sufficient
to place the other party in the position in which she would have been had
the promise been performed. A common organization of the Contracts
class makes the distinctive character of contract law clear at the very outset
of the course by means of the famous "hairy hand" case, in which a doctor
was found liable for failing to fulfill his promise that a skin graft operation
would cure the patient’s hand.85 The lesson of the case is that even if the
doctor was guilty of no negligence or malpractice, he was still obligated to
give his patient the monetary equivalent of what he promised. Suppose that
before the operation Dr. McGee came to his senses and told Hawkins that
he could not do the operation. Taken literally, the case means that Hawkins
would still be entitled to be placed in the position in which he would have
been if the promise had been performed. As Lon Fuller noted many years
ago, it is "a queer kind of ‘compensation’" to give the plaintiff "something
he never had."86 In some situations, some courts have balked at that notion.
In the old English case of Flureau v. Thornhill,87 the court refused to award
a prospective real estate buyer damages measured by the difference
84. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., No. 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 at *1 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
85. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
86. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1,
46 YALE L.J. 52, 52–53 (1936).
87. Flureau v. Thornhill, (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B.).
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between the contract price and the value of the promised property, noting
that a buyer is not "entitled to any damages for the fancied goodness of the
bargain, which he supposes he has lost."88 But, for the most part, we take it
for granted that the willingness to grant expectation damages is the core of
what it means to say that a contract is enforceable.
It is easy to lose sight of how problematic the basic contracts principle
is. Consider the case of Neri v. Retail Marine.89 That is a contracts
casebook classic on the so-called "lost volume seller" problem. The case
holds that a retail buyer who defaults can be liable for the seller’s lost
profits—even though the seller was able to sell the goods to someone else.
The theory is that, but for the buyer’s breach, the seller might have made
two sales and hence earned twice the profits. The case raises intriguing
issues both of general policy and of interpretation of the relevant provisions
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. What is generally not noted
is the human dimension of the case. After he had contracted to buy a
pleasure boat, the defendant learned that he had a serious health problem.
Rather than enjoying himself cruising around on the new boat, defendant
faced hospitalization and, one hopes, recuperation. Imagine his surprise on
learning that the seller refused to return his down payment, even though the
seller was able to sell the boat to someone else. Imagine his astonishment
on learning from the court that the seller was entitled to retain most of the
down payment as "compensation" for its lost profits. Nor was the amount
trivial—about $2,500 at the time of the case, or about $13,500 in today’s
dollars.
So both tort and contract are based on ethical principles that are far
from compelling. What of the law of restitution? The basic substantive
principle of the law of restitution is that one must not unjustifiably enrich
oneself at the expense of another. Consider a simple instance of the law of
restitution—recovery of money paid by mistake. Suppose that I receive
$5,000 from a bank with which I had done no business. Can I keep the
money? Does it matter that I did not do anything wrong to get the money?
Does it matter that the bank must have been sloppy to send money to
someone to whom they owed nothing? The answer is simple. If the bank
paid the money to me simply by mistake, the bank has an action in
restitution to recover the mistaken payment.90

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972).
E.g., Bank of Naperville v. Catalano, 408 N.E. 2d 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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For some reason, stories about such cases always seem to capture the
fancy of newspaper and television reporters. As the news stories suggest,
people are—or at least pretend to be—surprised by the fact that a person
who receives money by mistake is legally obligated to return the money.
There is, however, nothing at all problematic or puzzling about that result.
Nor is there anything novel about the result. The classic decision on
recovery of mistaken payment is a mid-seventeenth century English
decision. The case is so old that it is barely in English—decisions of the
time being reported in that odd argot known as Law French:
Come si un vient a moy & dit, Pay me my rent, I am your landlord, &
jeo respond give me your receipt and you shall have it & issint jeo ceo
pay, & puis un auter q˜ droit ad vient & demand & jeo luy pay, jeo poy
aver indebitatus assumpsit vers il q˜ done a moy le primier receipt.91

"Finders keepers, losers weepers" may be a common playground chant, but
it has never been an accurate statement of the law.92 As Lon Fuller noted
years ago, the case for restitution recovery is far stronger than the case for
recovery based on contract or tort, for it
involve[s] a combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust
gain . . . . If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice as the
maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the
restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial
intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to lose
one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy
between A and B is not one unit but two.93

Now consider the treatment of mistake in contract law. Generations of
law students have puzzled over the saga of Rose 2d of Aberlone, the
valuable breeding cow that was mistakenly sold at her meat price.94 The
fact that the contract was avoided on grounds of mistake in that case
provides fertile ground for classroom puzzlements. Should the woman who
sold a pretty stone for a small amount be able to set aside the contract once
it was discovered that the stone was a valuable topaz?95 Should the famous
violinist be granted relief from his contract to buy what he thought were
91. Bonnel v. Foulke, (1657) 82 Eng. Rep. 1224, 1224 (K.B.).
92. Indeed, it is not even accurate on the playground. Mom will always require
Johnny to give back the dollar bill that Mary dropped.
93. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 86, at 56; see also JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 3–8 (1951).
94. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
95. See Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885).
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two valuable eighteenth-century violins once it turned out that they were
fakes?96 Does it matter whether the mistake was mutual or unilateral?
Does it matter whether the mistaken party was careless? Does it matter
how significant the mistake was? Does it matter whether the mistake was
one of fact or of law?
If we grant relief from the contract in mistake cases, have we eroded
the very basis of contract liability? After all, it is routine for contracting
parties to disagree—sometimes dramatically—over the valuation of the
subject matter of the agreement. At the beginning of the course, law
students learn that the essential function of contract is to bind parties to
their deals, so that the reality of the parties’ performance will conform to
their assumptions. In studying mistake towards the end of the course, the
students find that a dramatic difference between assumption and reality may
be grounds for refusing to enforce the agreement. The cases seem to defy
simple explanation or classification. As Corbin put it:
Cases involving mistake are difficult of classification because of the
number and variety of factors to be considered. These factors are found
in many combinations. The citation of authorities for a rule stated in
general terms is made perilous by this fact. It is equally perilous, and it
may be positively harmful, to construct a rule of law, unless it is so
limited as to be applicable to a particular combination of many factors.
If this exact combination does not recur, what we really have is merely
one precedent, and not a rule.97

The fact that mistake seems to be far more problematic in contract than
in restitution is not really all that difficult to explain. The basic principle of
restitution is the unjust enrichment principle. The mistake cases in the law
of restitution are among the simplest instances of the unjust enrichment
principle. If A, by mistake, pays money to B, A should recover that money.
B has been enriched. The only reason that happened is that A made a
mistake. Requiring B to return the money corrects that unjust enrichment,
and causes no harm to B. It does not matter whether the amount was large
or small. It does not matter how the mistake was made. It does not matter
whether A was careful or negligent.
The basic principle of contract is pacta sunt servanda. Making people
perform promises that they have come to regret is the whole point of
contract law. As a judge put it, in a decision requiring farmers to sell their
cotton at the price they had agreed on,
96.
97.

See Smith v. Zimbalist, 38 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 597, at 583 (1960).
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Ladies and Gentlemen, this case illustrates about as well as any case that
will ever be in a court room that life is a two-way street, that when we
make bargains that turn out to be good for us that we keep them and
then when we make bargains that turn out to be bad for us that we also
keep them. That seems to be the essence of what this case is about. The
defendants, naturally, don’t want to sell cotton because the price has
gone up and if I were one of those defendants I would feel the same
way. I would be sick as an old hound dog who ate a rotten skunk, but
unfortunately—well, not unfortunately—fortunately we all abide by
contracts and that [is] the foundation of which all of the business that
you have heard about here today is done.98

The mistake cases in contract law are hard because they involve a stark
conflict between the basic principles of contract and restitution. If Walker
has to sell the valuable cow for a small amount of money, then Sherwood
will be enriched and Walker will be impoverished. But if Walker does not
have to sell the cow, then Sherwood will not get the benefit of his bargain.
It is hardly surprising that there is no simple resolution of that conundrum.
Yes, we do think that people should be held to their deals. But our
conviction about the justice of doing so has limits. The mistake cases in
contracts bring to the fore all of the uncertainties that we have about the
basis of enforcing agreements. By contrast, the mistake cases in restitution
are fairly simple. About the only reason for denying relief in such cases is
the possibility that the recipient of the mistaken benefit may have so
changed position as a result of the mistaken payment that it seems unduly
harsh to require restoration.
I have described the basic principles of the law of tort and contract in
somewhat unusual terms: "One must not unjustifiably harm another" and
"one must not unjustifiably fail to perform one’s promise." We do not
routinely make such an explicit reference to justice in describing the
foundations of tort or contract. If we were honest, we would have to do so.
Doing so, however, would make more explicit than we like the fact that the
underlying moral principles are far from clear. Why should your loss be
shifted to me? Why should I be obliged to pay money to you when you
have suffered no loss other than the disappointment of not getting
something that I promised you? The law of restitution, by contrast, does
unabashedly wear its moral premise on its sleeve: "One must not
unjustifiably enrich oneself at the expense of another." Perhaps part of the
reason that the law of restitution can get away with expressing its basic
98. Bolin Farms v. Am. Cotton Shippers Ass’n, 370 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (W.D. La.
1974) (quoting Judge Wilbur D. Owens of the Middle District of Georgia in an unreported
decision, Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fulton Benson).
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concept in such starkly moralistic language is a fairly simple point. The
basic principle of the law of restitution is simple. There is no need to hide
the ethical foundation of the law of restitution because that foundation is
capable of standing openly on its own. It is far less clear that the law of
contract or tort could survive such an explicit recognition of their
underlying ethical foundations.
There may, however, be an even simpler explanation for this apparent
difference between the law of restitution, on the one hand, and the law of
tort and contract, on the other. Restitution is the new kid on the block. It is
still struggling to achieve acceptance and respect. Law professors, to say
nothing of lawyers and law students, often have a hard time getting a handle
on the subject matter. So, those who advocate the utility of a unified
treatment of the law of restitution face the initial burden of explaining what
the topic is and why others should believe that it exists. That leads us to an
explicit statement of the basic unifying principle of the law of restitution.
Consider the first section of the Restatement: "A person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution." There is nothing like that in the restatements of contracts, torts,
or—so far as I know—any other field of law. The restatement of contracts
does not begin by stating, "A person who unjustifiably fails to perform a
promise made to another is subject to liability in contract." The restatement
of torts does not begin by stating, "A person who unjustifiably injures
another is subject to liability in tort." Why the difference? It would be
extraordinarily hard to explain the different approaches in terms of the
nature of the subject matter. As we have seen, once one looks to the actual
content of the law, there is little difference between restitution and contract
or tort in the extent to which specific principles incorporate indeterminate
assessments of justice or reasonableness.
History, however, provides a simple explanation for the difference
between restitution and contract or tort. Suppose that the ALI had been
formed in the early nineteenth century instead of the early twentieth
century. Suppose that someone proposed writing a "restatement of torts" in
1810. One suspects that lawyers would have been very puzzled by that
suggestion. One could do a restatement of trespass, or a restatement of
case, or a restatement of slander, or the like, but what is this new-fangled
topic of "tort"? By the early twentieth century, however, lawyers had
become used to using contract and tort as basic organizing principles.
Accordingly, it seemed only natural that there should be restatements of
those topics. For whatever reason, the law of restitution has taken a
different historical path. It is commonly said that the subject—as a
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coherent body of law—was born with the creation of the first restatement in
1936. The first task for the original restitution restatement project was to
justify its existence. Professors Warren Seavey and Austin Scott, the
reporters for the original restatement, confronted this task explicitly at the
outset of their law review article explaining the project:
The most recent product of the American Law Institute is a restatement
entitled "Restitution," a word which to the best of our knowledge is not
used as a title in any law digest or treatise. The matters with which it
deals are found scattered through many sections of the digests and
treatises on apparently diverse subjects. Your editor has asked us to
explain why such a grouping of material was undertaken and why there
was given to it a title which is indefinite in connotation and unfamiliar
to the profession.99

Contrast that with the situation of other fields of law. No twentieth or
twenty-first century writer would begin a discussion of a restatement of
contracts or torts with an apologia for the existence of the project. Of
course there is a law of tort and a law of contract. If any proof be needed,
there is the fact that we all suffered through courses on those subjects in the
first year of law school. If the Restatement (First) of Restitution had truly
been successful, the profession would by now be entirely familiar with the
idea that restitution is as useful an organizing concept as contract or tort.
There would be no need to start a discussion of the subject with a defense
of its existence. Restitution, however, remained an obscure topic
throughout the twentieth century. There never was a second restatement.
During the course of work on the current Restatement, the Reporter or the
ALI Director opened many of the discussions by noting that most members
of the Institute probably knew little or nothing about the field.100 A major
objective of the Restatement (Third) project has been to bring the field to
the attention of the profession. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the
Restatement (Third) begins by repeating the general statement that opened
the Restatement (First). Perhaps by the time of the fourth restatement that
provision can be dropped, but for the immediate future, the profession will
have to live with the fact that the restatement of restitution, unlike the
restatements of other areas of law, begins with a statement that really comes
down to a plea for recognition of the existence of the field.

99. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 29 (1938).
100. See, e.g., 77 A.L.I. PROC. 226–27 (May 17, 2000) (opening statements of Reporter
Andrew Kull).
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It is worth considering what difference it may make to judicial
decisions that the current Restatement still starts with the statement that "[a]
person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to
liability in restitution." As Professor Kull has noted, "Section 1 of the
original Restatement has reportedly been cited in more judicial opinions
than all of its other sections combined."101 It is not uncommon to find an
opinion in a restitution case that consists of little more than a recitation of
this general principle together with a largely useless laundry list of "factors"
to be considered. Professor Kull offers an illustration of such formulae,
noting that they "are not helpful, and . . . can lead to serious errors":
To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant;
(2) the defendant had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and
(3) the defendant accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances
making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.102

Imagine a tort or contract case. Would one encounter an opinion that
essentially consists of nothing more than a statement that:
To establish a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: (1) the defendant made a promise to the plaintiff; (2) the
plaintiff had an appreciation or knowledge of the promise; and (3) the
defendant failed to perform that promise under circumstances making it
inequitable for the defendant to fail to pay the plaintiff the value of the
promised performance.103

In light of the history of the development of the law of restitution, it may be
understandable that the Restatement continues to state the general principle
in Section 1. That should not, however, be taken as a license for sloppy
legal argumentation or opinion writing.
There is a reason that the Restatement does not consist of Section 1
alone. Section 1 is merely a description of the general principle that unifies
the specific legal rules that are set out in all of the rest of the Restatement.
The law of restitution is to be found in the body of the work, not in its
descriptive caption. One is reminded of the provisions commonly found in
legal agreements along the lines of the following: "Headings and captions
contained in this agreement are inserted for convenience or reference only,
101. R3RUE § 1 reporter’s note a.
102. Id. § 1 cmt. d.
103. Contracts teachers do routinely encounter such statements—in exam answers that
receive justifiably low grades.
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and are not to be deemed part of or to be used in construing this
agreement." Maybe even stronger language is needed. Perhaps Section 1
of the Restatement should be accompanied by something akin to the
Surgeon General’s cigarette package legend: "Warning—citation of this
section as authority for the resolution of any specific dispute may be
hazardous to your mental health."
Let us now turn from the general principle stated in Section 1 to
specific rules in the Restatement that make use of language along the lines
of "as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." In many such provisions, it
is doubtful that any such language is really needed. Consider the provision
on recovery of mistaken tax payments:
Section 19. Recovery of Tax Payments.
Except to the extent that a different rule is imposed by statute, the
payment of tax by mistake, or the payment of tax that is erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, gives the taxpayer a claim in restitution
against the taxing authority as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment . . . . If restitution pursuant to [the above] would disrupt
orderly fiscal administration or result in severe public hardship, the
court may on that account limit the relief to which the taxpayer would
otherwise be entitled.104

The text of the rule states the circumstances that a court may need to take
into account in deciding whether to recognize a claim. Having done so, it is
far from clear why there is any need for a reference to unjust enrichment.
The phrase "as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment" adds nothing and
could easily have been omitted.
Take another example, the provision on reformation for mistake in
expression:
Section 12. Mistake in Expression.
If an instrument is intended to transfer an interest in property or to
embody an obligation pursuant to a valid agreement, and
(a) by a mistake as to its contents or legal effect, the instrument fails to
reflect the terms of the agreement; and
(b) performance or enforcement on the terms of the instrument has
resulted or would result in the unjust enrichment of one party at the
expense of another; then

104.

R3RUE § 19 (emphasis added).
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the person disadvantaged by the mistake has a claim in restitution as
necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the other.105

In subsection (b), the "unjust enrichment" language seems to be only a way
of stating the point that relief is needed only when the instrument conveys a
greater interest than was intended. In the final sentence of Section 12, the
"as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment" formulation seems to be only a
reminder that any restitution claim may be subject to defenses, such as
change of position and bona fide purchase.106 Subsection (b) could easily
have been stated in other terms, and the last sentence is really not
necessary. Thus, the rule could have been stated as follows:
If an instrument is intended to transfer an interest in property or to
embody an obligation pursuant to a valid agreement; and
(a) by a mistake as to its contents or legal effect, the instrument fails to
reflect the terms of the agreement; and
(b) performance or enforcement on the terms of the instrument has
resulted or would result in the receipt of a greater interest than was
intended unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another; then
the person disadvantaged by the mistake has a claim in restitution as
necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the other.

No doubt one could proceed through many provisions of the
Restatement making similar changes to eliminate language along the lines
of "as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." I do not mean to say that
such changes are essential or even desirable. In discussing restitution
claims, it is common to use formulations such as "as necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment." Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Restatement uses
such language. The point is not to criticize the drafting style of the
Restatement. Rather, the point is that making fairly liberal use of such
general language is a matter of drafting style, not of substance. One could
redraft restatements of other topics using the style of this Restatement.
Thus, numerous provisions of the restatement of torts could say that, in
certain circumstances, a person is obliged to compensate another if her
conduct has unjustifiably caused the other to suffer some injury. Numerous
provisions of the restatement of contracts could say that, in certain
circumstances, a person is obliged to compensate another if she has
unjustifiably failed to perform her promise. Whether one formulation or the
other is better is only a matter of familiarity and style. It is, however,
105.
106.

Id. § 12 (emphasis added).
See id. § 12 cmt. f.
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important to realize that all we are talking about here is just that—style. It
would be entirely inaccurate to conclude that the difference in drafting style
used in the restatement of restitution, on the one hand, and the restatements
of contracts or torts, on the other, reflects any significant difference in the
content of the rules being restated.
Thus far, I have suggested that the law of restitution is no less
determinate, and no more dependent upon vague principles of justice, than
other bodies of law. Accordingly, the repeated usage of the phrase "as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment" in various provisions of the
Restatement should not be taken to suggest that there is any significant
difference between restitution and other branches of law in the extent to
which outcomes can be stated in simple rules. The flip side of that
observation is that one should not expect the law of restitution to be more
determinate than other bodies of law. Where it is simply not possible to
state the applicable rules without including a fair measure of discretion, we
simply must accept that fact. In one area—the rules concerning tracing—
the Restatement seems to have lost sight of that fact. Ironically, in one area
where it is impossible to state rules in simple black-and-white terms, the
Restatement attempts to do just that.
Suppose that defendant has obtained an item of property under such
circumstances that the law of restitution requires him to turn that item over
to plaintiff. Consider a case of theft. Scalawag steals a Ford from Fred. As
a matter of simple property law, the Ford still belongs to Fred, so Fred can
replevy it from Scalawag. That would be true even if Scalawag is
insolvent, owing debts to many other people, including people from whom
he stole goods that cannot be found in his hands. Suppose, however, that
Scalawag has swapped the Ford for a tractor. The tractor never belonged to
Fred, so Fred has no special rights to the tractor as a matter of simple
property law. Under the law of restitution, however, Fred can obtain a
declaration that Scalawag holds the tractor in constructive trust for Fred,
provided that Fred can show that Scalawag obtained the tractor by
swapping the Ford for it. The Restatement states this principle without
qualification: "A claimant entitled to restitution from property may obtain
restitution from any traceable product of that property, without regard to
subsequent changes of form."107 Although this may seem like a simple
proposition, it is, in fact, virtually impossible to come up with a coherent
explanation for the result that Fred gets the tractor.

107.

Id. § 58(1).
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In the first place, it is important to recognize that the issue here does
not involve a contest between the tracing claimant and the wrongdoer.
Tracing only matters if the wrongdoer is insolvent. If Scalawag, in our
simple example, has sufficient assets to satisfy all of his creditors’ claims, it
really does not matter whether Fred gets a money judgment for the value of
the Ford or the tractor itself. Either way, Fred is made whole. The tracing
claim matters only if Scalawag is insolvent. The question is whether we
can justify giving preference to the claim of the creditor who can trace over
the claims of creditors who cannot trace.
In a variety of places, the Restatement seems to misstate this issue.
For example, a Comment to Section 58 frames the issue as a contest
between the restitution claimant and others who decided to become
creditors: "The restitution claimant bases a right to recovery on the
avoidance of a transaction that is invalid for reasons such as fraud or
mistake; the general creditor has made a valid extension of credit."108 That
is not a sufficient justification for granting preference to the restitution
claimant. In the first place, the category of unsecured creditors includes
lots of people who did not make a voluntary extension of credit. Tort
victims are the obvious example. In any significant bankruptcy, tort
victims are likely to be a significant class of creditors. Consider, for
example, all of the people who had claims against Johns-Manville
Corporation as a result of asbestos produced by Manville.109 Many other
claimants, though they may have contract claims, would hardly be
accurately described as voluntary lenders (e.g., unpaid employees). So, we
cannot justify tracing by saying that the competing claimants are "just
creditors."
In other places, the Restatement does seem to recognize that the issue
is one of preference among creditors, but offers inadequate explanations for
the resolution of that conflict. For example, at a number of places, the
108. Id. § 58 cmt. b. In the version presented at the A.L.I. annual meeting, this
Comment referred to the creditor as having made a "voluntary extension of credit." R3RUE
§ 58 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008). A similar change was made in Section 55 cmt. d
("A’s implicit claim—to justify in equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust—is that
B’s unsecured creditor C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if B’s debt to C is
satisfied from assets that B obtained from A by fraud.") which had previously referred to C
as a "voluntary and unsecured creditor." The deletion of the term "voluntary" is a nod in the
direction of the point made in this Article, but the Restatement still fails to offer a persuasive
justification for the preference given to the tracing claimant.
109. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195, 2199 (2009) (noting that over
600,000 asbestos claimants have received payments from the Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust since its creation in 1989).
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Restatement suggests that if other creditors can reach the traceable product
of the claimant’s property, then they will be unjustly enriched.110 The
problem with any such explanation is that it seeks to explain why the
restitution claimant has priority over other creditors. But that is not the
issue. Neither at state law nor in bankruptcy do we have any general
principle that a restitution claimant has priority over other creditors.
Rather, the issue is whether a restitution claimant who can trace should
have priority over other claimants, including a restitution claimant who
cannot trace. It is tracing, not restitution, that is the key. To explain the
tracing preference, we have to compare a restitution claimant who can
successfully trace with one who cannot trace. None of the rationales
commonly offered for the tracing preference respond to that question.
Suppose that Scalawag has not only stolen a Ford from Fred but has
also stolen a Chevy from Charlotte. Scalawag swaps the Ford for a tractor.
Scalawag sells the Chevy and commingles the sales proceeds in an account
in such fashion that Charlotte is unable to trace. The tracing rules say Fred
gets the tractor and Charlotte waits in line with the other unsecured
creditors. Why should Fred do so much better than Charlotte? It is not
convincing to say that the tractor is only there because Scalawag stole
Fred’s Ford. Some other assets would not be there if Scalawag had not
stolen Charlotte’s Chevy. So it is hard to see why we should say that the
other creditors would be unjustly enriched if they got the tractor, since we
do allow them to get the untraceable product of the Chevy. In a setting
such as this, Dale Oesterle quite convincingly refuted the argument for
tracing in an article published many years ago.111
110. See R3RUE § 55 reporter’s note d ("[T]he attempt to enforce a constructive trust in
a three-party contest resolves itself into (and ultimately depends upon) the contention that
the debtor’s general creditors stand to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the restitution
claimant."); id. § 55 cmt. h ("[T]he equitable basis for the claimant’s priority is the assertion
that the creditor will be unjustly enriched if the defendant’s debt is discharged with property
to which (as between claimant and defendant) the claimant is equitably entitled."). This
notion may have some intuitive appeal, and may be persuasive in some cases but, like
virtually all other rationales for tracing, it ultimately fails. The thought presumably is that
the assets in question would not be there but for the wrongdoer’s acquisition of its
antecedent. But, that does not really help. Suppose that an unsecured creditor sold goods on
credit to the debtor. That unsecured creditor could say that, but for his extension of credit,
the asset would not be there, but that is not a reason to allow the unsecured creditor to
recover the property. The "but for" notion is really a basis for the "swelling of assets" theory
that has now been rejected by most authorities, including the Restatement. See id. § 58
cmt. e.
111. See Dale Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace
Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 36 CORNELL L. REV. 172 (1982).
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There is, however, a significant problem. Suppose that we reject the
position taken in the Restatement and conclude that we cannot justify the
preference that we give to the tracing claimant. Though that position is
intellectually sound, it has rather anomalous implications. Once we see that
there really is no convincing logical explanation for the tracing rules, we
end up with the conclusion that there also is no convincing logical rationale
for allowing a replevin claimant to get back his own stolen car from the
estate of the insolvent thief.112 Suppose that Scalawag steals two identical
cars, one from Mary and one from Sally. Each day he flips a coin to decide
which one to drive. One day he crashes the car he was driving. He is now
insolvent. The person whose car is still there gets it back. The other person
just has an unsecured claim. Is that fair? Is it rational? Is there some
logical explanation? No, but if Mary’s car is still there then, by golly, we
are going to let her take it back. Sorry, Sally, it is Mary’s car. The
justification is not logic, but fairly primitive concepts that are very much
wrapped up in our notions of property. It is Mary’s car and she gets it back,
even though only someone who checked the VIN could tell whether it was
Mary’s car or Sally’s car.
The problem with the tracing rules is that they try to extend this
primitive property notion, and do so when the primitive justification—"It’s
my thing, gosh darn it!"—just doesn’t work. Suppose Scalawag steals a car
from Mary, though he happens to own an otherwise identical car. He
disassembles both cars, tosses the parts into a pile, and reconstructs two
cars, taking the parts at random. Then he does his coin toss, drive, and
crash routine. Can Mary recover the surviving car from Scalawag’s estate?
How do we decide whether it was or was not Mary’s car? That is the
question that the tracing rules pretend to answer, and they do so by ignoring
the problem. If we applied the standard tracing rules, we would "deem"
whichever car remained to have been assembled from the parts of Mary’s
car. In other words, to the question "How do we decide whether it’s still
the same thing when all the parts have been mixed up?" the tracing rules
basically say, "Assume that the parts had not been mixed up . . . ."113
112. The argument that follows is a somewhat condensed version of a point that I
developed in James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 471, at 491–501 (1990).
113. One is reminded of the old joke about the mathematician, physicist and economist
on the desert island trying to figure out how to open cans of food, with the economist saying
"assume we have a can opener . . . ." Note a further irony. If we say that we want our
tracing rules to be at least a plausible way of answering the question of physical identity,
then we would end up with a rigorous version of the "proportionate part" concept that Austin
Scott developed. See A. SCOTT & W. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 517.2 (4th ed.
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So, what to do? A restatement has to be just that—it has to more or
less take the results of the cases as it finds them. So, rejecting tracing
altogether is not feasible, even if it might be the most justifiable result. But,
a restatement also needs to be honest about the strengths and weakness of
the approaches that have prevailed in the cases. It is unfortunate that the
Restatement recites purported justifications that really cannot be supported,
e.g., the notion that tracing can be justified by the thought that Scalawag’s
unsecured creditors would be unjustly enriched if they shared in the
traceable product. Moreover, it would have been an easy matter for the
Restatement to do some good on these issues. The Restatement could have
done here what it does in so many other contexts—admit openly that just
results cannot be produced by rigid rules. There may be some cases in
which the number of steps required in the tracing analysis are sufficiently
few that it seems just as sound to give the claimant the traceable product of
her property as her own property. It is, however, unlikely that that will
always be the case. Tracing claims generally do not involve simple swaps
of tangible goods of the sort considered above. More often, they rely on
assertions that a restitution claimant can identify the property that should be
subjected to her claim by means of the fictions embodied in the rules on
tracing through commingled bank accounts.114 By the time one has worked
one’s way through all the complexities of the application of those rules to
real world cases, it is far from clear that one would really feel confident
about preferring the tracing claimant over other claimants, including
restitution claimants who cannot trace.115
Why not, then, simply use the formulation adopted in the Restatement
in so many other contexts? The relevant provisions could state that a
restitution claimant may have a claim to trace, if recognition of that claim is
"necessary to prevent unjust enrichment" of the other creditors. To be sure,
one would be unable to provide a bright-line test to identify such cases.
There is, however, nothing wrong with being honest. The Restatement
should have acknowledged more openly than it does that there is a
fundamental weakness in the claim that a claimant who can trace has an
unassailable right to priority over a claimant who cannot trace. That would
1989). When Scalawag reassembled the two cars, 50% of each belonged to Mary. Indeed,
we would have to apply that notion both to the equitable lien side and the constructive trust
side. For an elaboration of this point, see Rogers, supra note 112, at 497–500.
114. R3RUE §§ 59, 60.
115. For a thoughtful treatment of the flexibility needed in assessing tracing claims in
bankruptcy, see Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
297.
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have made it easier for the Restatement to provide a necessary measure of
discretion for a court to reject a tracing claim when it seems to produce
inequity rather than equity.116 The reason that we need plenty of flexibility
to deny tracing claims is that there frequently is no plausible rationale for
the preference that tracing otherwise awards.
In fact, we know what happens if courts feel that restitution claims
may result in giving an unfair preference to one creditor over others. They
refuse to enforce the restitution claim, relying on very questionable
grounds. The prime example is In re Omegas Group, Inc.117 A creditor of
an insolvent business asserted that it was entitled to preference over other
creditors on the grounds that the way the debtor got money from them
could be regarded as fraud, and that the debtor therefore held the proceeds
of its dealings with the creditor in constructive trust. In an opinion
noteworthy for its excess of rhetoric over analysis, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit refused to grant constructive trust relief, noting that
"[c]onstructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they
take from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from
the offending debtor."118 Professor Kull has delivered trenchant criticism of
the Omegas Group opinion, noting that it is based on an apparent ignorance
of concepts that, as a matter of the law of restitution, have been settled for
centuries.119 As he states, the opinion displays a "pervasive doctrinal
myopia."120
As Professor Kull has noted, there were many sound reasons for the
result in the Omegas Group case. One might have said that the claimant
had not made out the case that the debtor acquired property by fraud, or one
might have rejected the claim on the grounds that the claimant lacked
"clean hands," or one might have found that the claimant could not succeed
in a tracing argument. Indeed, the Omegas Group opinion does not even
discuss the tracing point. Suppose, however, that, in a case like Omegas
Group, the claimant did have a plausible claim of fraud, was not guilty of
unclean hands, and did—with the benefit of the elaborate tracing
116. The only flexibility recognized by the Restatement is the rule, newly articulated in
Section 61, that a court should not recognize a tracing claim beyond the extent of the
claimant’s actual loss when such recovery would come at the expense of wrongdoers, other
creditors, or innocent dependents. R3RUE § 61.
117. In re Omegas Grp., Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at 1452.
119. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265 (1999).
120. Id. at 275.
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presumptions—succeed in a tracing argument. Even a judge who
completely understands the law of restitution and tracing might well be
troubled by the suggestion that a creditor who happens to be able to succeed
in a tracing argument should come out whole, while another creditor with
an indistinguishable claim who cannot trace must line up with all of the
other creditors and receive little or nothing.
Suppose that the Restatement recognized openly that it is impossible to
articulate a universally convincing justification for the tracing preference.
Suppose that the Restatement openly stated that a court asked to rule on
such a case needs to consider whether granting that preference is "necessary
to prevent unjust enrichment" of the other creditors. At least in cases where
the preference depends on a tracing argument, a court that found itself
unable to stomach the preference could state honestly that there is no sound
basis for granting such relief. That court could well say that if the matter
involved only specific property that the debtor had obtained from the
claimant by fraud, or perhaps property obtained by the debtor by a simple
transaction that clearly could not have occurred but for the acquisition of
the property by fraud, then the preference would be granted. At some point,
however, the chain becomes sufficiently attenuated that we no longer feel
the intuitive appeal of the simple property notion that if the claimant’s
property is still there then she gets it back. It seems to me that it would be
far better to openly acknowledge that fact and give judges a straightforward
way of dealing with concerns about the justice of tracing claims.
So, is restitution indeterminate? Yes and no. Yes, there is an
unavoidable element of indeterminacy in the effort to state the rules of the
law of restitution. That, however, is hardly a phenomenon unique to the
law of restitution. If restitution is indeterminate, so are contract and tort.
The fact that the current Restatement makes such liberal use of phrases like
"as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment" is merely a matter of drafting
style, attributable in large measure to the fact that this field of law is still
relatively poorly understood relative to other fields of law. Courts dealing
with restitution claims should be no more willing to explain their decisions
merely by vague references to unjust enrichment than they would feel about
making similar assertions in cases involving other legal subjects. There is
more to the Restatement than the truism in Section 1 that "[a] person who is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution." There is, however, no use denying that in some areas it is
difficult or impossible to state the rules of restitution in simple black-andwhite terms.

